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Abstract
This study examined a knowledge-centered theory of institutional trust development. In the
context of trust in water regulatory institutions, the moderating impact of knowledge was
tested to determine if there were longitudinal changes in the bases of institutional trust as a
function of increases in knowledge about a target institution. We hypothesized that as peo-
ple learn about an institution with which they were previously unfamiliar, they begin to form
more nuanced perceptions, distinguishing the new institution from other institutions and rely-
ing less upon their generalized trust to estimate their trust in that institution. Prior to having
specific, differential information about a new institution, we expected institutional trust to be
a function of generalized trust variables such as dispositional trust and trust in government.
The longitudinal experiment involved 185 college students randomly assigned to one of
three information conditions. Every 3 months for 15 months, participants read information
about water regulatory institutions or a control institution. At each time point, participants
reported their trust in and perceptions of the trust- and distrust-worthiness of the water regu-
latory institutions. Participants also completed measures of knowledge of water regulatory
institutions, dispositional trust, and governmental trust. Our manipulation check indicated
that, as expected, those in the experimental group increased in subjective knowledge of
water regulatory institutions to a greater extent than those in the control condition. Consis-
tent with our hypotheses, there was some evidence that, compared to the control group,
the experimental group relied less on their general trust in government as a basis for their
trust in water regulatory institutions. However, contrary to our hypotheses, there was no evi-
dence the experimental group relied less on dispositional trust as a basis for institutional
trust. There also was some evidence the experimental group’s trust in water regulatory insti-
tutions was less affected by fluctuations of trustworthiness (but not distrustworthiness) per-
ceptions over time. This suggests that knowledge results in the development of more stable
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institutional trust attitudes, but that trustworthiness and distrustworthiness perceptions may
operate somewhat differently when impacting trust in specific institutions.
1. Introduction
Trust is essential to societal functioning. From its effects on markets to the operation of
democracy, trust in institutions facilitates relationships and permits social exchanges [1–4].
Understanding how people’s trust in an institution (hereafter, referred to as “institutional
trust”) develops and evolves over time is not only important in its own right, it is even more
significant given evidence that the American public’s trust and confidence in its government
has decreased steadily over the past few decades [5–8]. This trend of decreasing trust has been
identified by both scholars and policy makers as one of the fundamental problems facing dem-
ocratic societies today [9].
Although considerable work has examined changes in the public’s institutional trust over
time and the factors that influence such changes [10, 11], a number of gaps remain. Despite
the potentially critical role that knowledge is conjectured to play in the development of trust in
an institution [12, 13], there has been relatively little empirical examination of the impact of
information and knowledge on institutional trust [13]. Similarly, research has yet to address
systematically how or whether the large number of hypothesized bases that underlie and affect
people’s trust in an institution may change over time. Such bases include pre-existing trustor
dispositions, assessments of the institution’s worthiness of being trusted, and loyalties or com-
mitments the trustor may form toward the institution [14–17].
A number of theories suggest the most important bases of trust will change as people gain
“sophistication”—that is, as they learn more about and/or have experience with the trustee
[18–22]. However, there are few longitudinal studies of whether and how these bases change
over time and, in particular, as people increase their knowledge about an institution. As others
have noted, cross-sectional studies are sufficient to examine different bases of trust, but longi-
tudinal studies are needed to disentangle closely related and potentially reciprocal variables
[23–25].
In the present study, we address some of the gaps in the literature by conducting a longitu-
dinal experiment examining institutional trust and its potential bases in individuals who had
very little initial knowledge or experience with the target institution. We focus on trust in
water regulatory institutions—governmental entities that are unfamiliar to most in the general
public, but ones likely to become increasingly important as climate change impacts water avail-
ability and quality across the nation [26].
1.1. Institutional trust and knowledge
Many definitions of trust exist [27]. We define institutional trust as an attitude toward a spe-
cific institution (or organization, business, etc.) characterized by positive expectations that the
institution will appropriately fulfill its functions [11, 28] (S2 File, Note A). Trust is most often
measured with survey/questionnaire items directly assessing the degree of trust/confidence
one has in a given institution to do its job (e.g., “how much of the time can you trust [institu-
tion] to do what is right?” or “how much confidence do you have in [institution or those
running the institution]?”) [15, 29–31]. Institutional trust conceptualized in this way is not
especially nuanced and instead addresses an overarching, global assessment of an institution.
Most major public opinion polls measure trust in this manner, and it is these measures that
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primarily fuel the conversation regarding the public’s decreasing institutional trust, although it
is possible that a more nuanced understanding of trust might contribute to a more precise
understanding of how people are assessing societal institutions (S2 File, Note B).
One factor that appears to influence how people assess institutions is familiarity with the
institutions. Research has shown changes in knowledge about an institution can have impor-
tant effects on attitudes toward the institution. Studies have documented both positive [13]
and negative [32] effects of increased knowledge on institutional trust. Knowledge may also
lead to the ability to differentiate between specific aspects of—and therefore to hold more
nuanced views of—an institution. For example, one study found that greater knowledge about
Congress can enable individuals to distinguish between Congress as an institution and individ-
ual lawmakers [32].
Thus, there is good reason to expect that knowledge about an institution shapes levels of,
and reasons for, individuals’ trust in it (i.e., their institutional trust) [23, 33]. We conceptualize
three “stages” of institutional trust that vary in terms of the bases of trust and amount of
knowledge of the trustor: (1) generalized trust as the primary basis of both institutional trust
and trustworthiness perceptions in the no or low-knowledge undifferentiated stage, (2) trust-
worthiness perceptions as providing shifting bases for institutional trust during a second stage
of increasing knowledge and differentiation (differentiated stage), and (3) felt commitment as
the basis of institutional trust in the high-knowledge committed stage (S2 File, Note C). While
our experiment and hypotheses focus primarily on the first two stages, we describe all three
stages to provide context.
1.2. A Three-stage developmental model of knowledge-based trust
1.2.1. Undifferentiated stage 1: Generalized trust as the source of undifferentiated insti-
tutional trust and trustworthiness perceptions. Various forms of generalized trust, like the
trustor’s propensity to trust people (i.e., dispositional trust) or propensity to trust certain types
of institutions (e.g., governmental trust), are typically important predictors of trust in specific
institutions [18, 23, 34–37]. These generalized trust propensities are similar to personality
traits in that they differ between people and likely stem from a combination of genetic predis-
positions, biological factors, and prior social and emotional experiences with other people and
institutions [38]. For instance, a person may have a generally trusting personality and may
assume most strangers are well-intentioned. Another person may have an untrusting personal-
ity such that the individual is suspicious of most people. Similarly, a person might be prone to
trusting a range of institutions even when unfamiliar with them (for example, defaulting to
trusting the police, fire fighters, and city council when moving to a new town) or might be
prone toward suspicion of most institutions. Generalized trust is thought of as relatively stable;
however, like personality traits, it is expected to show development, evolving over time in
response to societal and life changes and events [39–42].
Many theories propose that generalized trust (i.e., a propensity to trust across targets) and
institutional trust (i.e., trust in a specific institution) are distinct but are likely to be positively
related [14, 18]. However, the variance shared by generalized trust and institutional trust var-
ies, and it is not always important or even statistically significant [22, 23]. Some researchers
have thus proposed that a person’s generalized trust provides a “baseline” that is applied when
forming judgments of targets or trustees that are not well-known. That is, without specific
knowledge about an institution, trustors will be in an “undifferentiated” stage in which their
trust attitudes toward that institution are relatively undifferentiated from their generalized
trust attitudes.
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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Similarly, during this stage, there is likely to be a lack of differentiation among institutional
trust, generalized trust, and one’s perceptions of the trustworthiness of the target institution.
Trustworthiness perceptions refer to assessments of the target that suggest whether it is, or is
not, worthy of trust. These perceptions, unlike institutional trust, are quite nuanced. Past
research has identified several perceived trustworthiness constructs (or “facets”) related to
institutional trust. Facets of trustworthiness include perceptions of a trustee’s ability, benevo-
lence, integrity [18, 35, 36, 43], and perceived legitimacy [44–47]. Further facets include proce-
dural justice constructs such as whether the target or trustee is perceived as having respect for
the trustor, whether the trustee exhibits neutrality, whether the trustee gives voice to stakehold-
ers (such as the trustor), and whether the trustee is characterized by fairness [48–51]. Cynicism
—a view that the institution’s motives for acting run counter to the interests of the individual
[46]—may represent an explicitly negative aspect of perceived (dis)trustworthiness.
Perceptions of trustworthiness are strong and robust predictors of other trust attitudes [52,
53], even to the point of making statistical and measurement distinctions between “trustwor-
thiness” and direct assessments of “trust” quite difficult [23]. We hypothesize this lack of dis-
tinction may be especially true in Stage 1 (undifferentiated), where trustors are likely to
ascertain trustworthiness judgements in the same way as they determine their baseline institu-
tional trust—that is, based on their generalized trust. This would result in strong relations
between institutional trust and trustworthiness assessments—as well as between different
types of trustworthiness assessments (e.g., perceived benevolence versus perceived compe-
tence)—because of a lack of institution-specific information.
1.2.2. Differentiation stage 2: Differentiation of trust constructs based on changing per-
ceptions of trustworthiness. We propose that stage 2 occurs when increasing knowledge of
the institution leads to differentiation between various facets of perceived trustworthiness,
which then leads more generally to differentiation between generalized trust and trustworthi-
ness perceptions and between generalized trust and institutional trust (see H1 and H2 below).
That is, trustors gain knowledge and sophistication about an institution, and form more
nuanced trustworthiness judgments (e.g., judging the institution as competent but not benevo-
lent, or as benevolent but not honest). This results in, first, the differentiation of trustworthi-
ness judgments (now based on knowledge of the specific institution) from one’s generalized
trust; and, second, reduced need to rely on generalized trust to determine one’s institutional
trust, because one can rely on one’s more specific (and differentiated) trustworthiness
judgments.
These arguments are consistent with prior research and theory. For example, relating to the
differentiation of trustworthiness perceptions, Mayer and his colleagues [18] propose that peo-
ple quickly form impressions of a trustee’s integrity and competence, whereas benevolence
assessments may take longer to develop. Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis [54] similarly argued
that some trustworthiness perceptions—such as benevolence and integrity judgments—may
be too highly correlated to distinguish early on, but differentiation becomes possible with
increasing knowledge of and experience with a target. Relating to the differentiation of gener-
alized trust and institutional trust, the sophistication-interaction theory of public opinion [20]
proposes that “low sophisticates” with relatively little knowledge of an issue do not have the
ability to rely on domain-specific principles to guide their preferences and therefore must
draw upon more general concerns to a greater extent than “high-sophisticates” [55–57].
Although primarily applied to policy preferences, when extended to the area of trust attitudes,
this theoretical perspective suggests those who have low knowledge of an institution may rely
on heuristic cues or shortcuts—such as relying on their sense of generalized trust—to estimate
how much they should trust that institution in lieu of specific information. In contrast, indi-
viduals who are more knowledgeable may rely less upon generalized trust because they can
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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draw on specific knowledge of the institution and its role in the governing process and to
make judgments about specific aspects of its trustworthiness. In support of this theoretical
extension, some data have shown that, as the trustor gains information about the trustee, the
influence of generalized trust on trust in specific targets decreases in favor of more specific
evaluations [18, 57, 58].
Finally, our knowledge-centered theory of institutional trust development proposes that
the differentiation of trustworthiness facets also has implications for their specific relation-
ships to institutional trust. Depending on the context, we theorize that changes in certain
trustworthiness judgments (instead of generalized trust) will become the source of changes
in individual’s trust in that institution (institutional trust). However, as trustworthiness judg-
ments become more differentiated from each other and from generalized trust factors, some
trustworthiness factors may be more important predictors than others (see H3 below). The
precise pattern of differences, however, is difficult to predict given the current state of the lit-
erature [59].
1.2.3. Committed stage 3: Committed institutional trust (or distrust) characterized by
increasing stability. Commitment often refers to a sense of loyalty to an institution that is
resilient in the face of specific dissatisfactions encountered over time [15, 60–63]. However,
commitments could be either positive or negative—with negative commitments characterized
by “enduring distrust” or stable resistance rather than loyalty [64, 65]. Commitment, therefore,
reflects an increasingly stable and persistent feeling toward a specific institution that differs
among individuals. Commitment also typically is viewed as arising from continued and
repeated exposure to the institution over time rather than acute interactions at a single point
in time [66, 67].
Commitment has been examined as both a basis and outcome of trust [15, 19, 68]. Here, we
propose the development of committed trust (or distrust) attitudes will be reflected in greater
attitude stability over time. Thus, although time-specific variations in trustworthiness percep-
tions will affect trust, as more time passes and more knowledge of an institution is gained,
one’s level of institutional trust will gradually stabilize and become less dependent upon
fluctuations in one’s perceptions of the institution’s trustworthiness [68, 69] (see H4 below).
Consistent with this hypothesis, theories of attitude development suggest that as people gain
knowledge, their attitudes become more stable and less influenced by additional information
[70, 71].
1.3. Summary of hypotheses
Based on our knowledge-centered theory of institutional trust development, we developed
four hypotheses that were tested in the current study. The first two hypotheses relate to the dif-
ferentiation of generalized trust and other trust-relevant constructs as participants move from
stage 1 to 2, and thus are very similar:
(H1, H2) As knowledge about a specific institution increases, the relationships will decrease
between generalized trust variables (e.g., dispositional trust and non-specific governmental
trust) and both
(H1) institutional trust (i.e., trust in a specific institution), and
(H2) trustworthiness variables (i.e., perceptions of a specific institution’s trust-relevant quali-
ties such as its benevolence, integrity, and competence).
Our third hypothesis also focuses on movement from stage 1 to 2, but focuses on the rela-
tions between institutional trust and trustworthiness perceptions as people form more
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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nuanced and knowledge-based views, and as specific facets of trustworthiness become distin-
guished from one another:
(H3) As knowledge of a specific institution increases, the relationships between institution-
specific trustworthiness variables and institutional trust (trust in that specific institution)
will change.
This hypothesis is not directional—as noted in our theoretical description, the direction of
change is uncertain and may be context-specific.
Finally, although there is little prior research to inform how long it might take for commit-
ment to form toward an institution, we nonetheless posed a fourth hypothesis that addressed
whether there was evidence of stage 3 processes (i.e., attitude stability) in our data:
(H4) Among those gaining in knowledge, over time, changes in institutional trust will become
less associated with fluctuations in trustworthiness perceptions.
1.4. The current study
To test our four hypotheses, we conducted a longitudinal experiment in which every 3 months
for 15 months we repeatedly assessed all participants’ institutional trust and trustworthiness
perceptions of water regulatory institutions. In addition, participants read information about
an institution every three months. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three infor-
mation conditions, two of them were experimental conditions and one was a control condi-
tion. Participants in the experimental conditions read information about water regulatory
institutions, while participants in the control condition read about a non-water-related
institution. Initial analyses indicated our sample had very little prior knowledge of either the
experimental or control institutions. The control condition exposed participants to the same
longitudinal process in which they completed the same repeated measures and learned about
an institution, but the institution they learned about was not relevant to the target institution
that all participants repeatedly evaluated. This means that participants in the control condition
were reporting their institutional trust in and trustworthiness perceptions of an institution
they had not been learning about during this study.
This design allowed us to assess change in our trust-relevant variables over time, as well as
whether and how relationships among the variables changed. We examined the effects of
knowledge gains about an institution in two ways. First, participants either learned about the
target institution (experimental group), or they did not (control group). Second, among those
who did learn about the target institutions, we examined this learning process longitudinally,
assuming at the outset that knowledge should positively correlate with time.
2. Method
2.1. Ethics and human subjects
All participants in this research were age 17 or older and provided written consent to partici-
pate. The research met the requirements for exemption from the need to obtain parental con-
sent for those participants who were not of legal age of majority (which is age 19 in NE); thus,
no consent was obtained from parent/guardians of those participants. All aspects of this
research, including the consent procedure and waiver of parental consent, were presented to
and approved by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board for the Ethical
Treatment of Human Subjects (IRB Approval #: 20101211178EP). Six surveys were adminis-
tered to 202 students from two Midwestern universities. The first survey asked participants to
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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complete baseline measures, and the experimental manipulation started on the second survey.
Consequently, we removed participants completing only the first survey (S2 File, Note D).
The final set of 185 participants averaged 20.76 years of age (SD = 3.39); 58% self-identified as
women and 95% as White.
2.2. Procedure
Participants were recruited via email and classroom visits by the authors from a variety of sci-
ence classes (e.g., biology, environmental science, psychology) (S2 File, Note E). Participants
completed 6 surveys over 15 months, with approximately 3 months between surveys. We
emailed participants a link to each online survey to complete at their convenience during a
two-week period and sent reminder emails. To provide incentive against attrition, participants
received increasing payments for each survey they completed, with a total payment of $155 if
all surveys were completed.
In each survey, participants completed a battery of questions including measures of our key
variables of dispositional trust, institutional trust in and trustworthiness perceptions of the
water institutions (the target/trustee of interest in this study), and subjective and objective
knowledge of the water regulatory institutions. All participants (control and experimental)
completed the same battery of measures in the surveys administered after the randomly
assigned information was presented.
2.3. Materials and measures
2.3.1. Information manipulation. We designed the information manipulations to
enhance participant knowledge of the institution to which the participant was randomly
assigned. The institutions were two Nebraska water-regulatory agencies, Department of Natu-
ral Resources (DNR) and Natural Resource Districts (NRD), and the state’s child welfare
department, Health and Human Services (DHHS). The first information exposure presented
basic descriptive information, including the responsibilities, jurisdictions, and authority of the
relevant institution. The information provided during subsequent contacts was comprised of
various newspaper articles and factsheets tailored to address specific topics. The information
in the water-regulatory institution conditions was always relevant to Nebraska’s water regula-
tion policies. The information in the control condition was always related to Nebraska’s child
welfare policies. To help ensure knowledge gains, information about each institution was pre-
sented along with questions designed to encourage active engagement (e.g., “can you think of
any instances in which you, or someone you know, might have been affected by the [institu-
tion’s] decisions?”). We also included reading-check questions that were specific to the reading
and often drew attention to factors that would be relevant for trust judgments (e.g., “The cur-
rent drought has resulted in closing notices being sent by the DNR to surface water irrigators.
What method is being used in deciding priority for irrigation?”).
Although we began with three institution information conditions, a preliminary review of
participant comments suggested participants might not be distinguishing between the two
water-regulatory institutions. Because the two institutions do, in fact, serve overlapping roles
(e.g., both are major players within the framework for setting allocations for irrigation), we
examined whether it was appropriate to combine the DNR and NRD conditions and measures.
Bivariate correlations between measures of institutional trust in the two water regulatory insti-
tutions were strong at each time point, with Pearson correlation coefficients ranging from .70
to .92, all p’s< .01. Correlations between trustworthiness ratings of the two water institutions
(e.g., competence, legitimacy, etc.) were also high at each time point, ranging from .85 to .97,
all p’s< .01. In addition, bivariate correlations between subjective knowledge ratings for the
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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DNR, NRD, and general water regulation were significant within time points, ranging from
.55 to .77, all p’s< .01.
Given the lack of statistical distinction between the two water regulatory institutions and
their factual overlap, we combined the two conditions. Our experimental variable was there-
fore dichotomously coded: 0 = control information (DHHS), 1 = experimental information
(DNR or NRD).
2.3.2. Measures. The following items were completed by each participant at each time
point (the primary measures and items are in the S1 File, Appendix of Measures, in the online
Supporting Information). Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for each scale as measured
at Survey 1, as well as the range of internal reliabilities obtained at each of the six surveys.
Unless otherwise noted, participants responded to items in our measures by rating their agree-
ment on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (coded 1) to strongly agree
(coded 7, with a neutral midpoint = 4), and items were averaged (after reverse-scoring if
appropriate) to create scales.
Knowledge: Like past research investigating political sophistication [72–75], we included
both objective and subjective knowledge measures as checks of our information manipula-
tions. All participants (both control and experimental) indicated their subjective knowledge of
each of the two water regulatory institutions by responding to the item: “How knowledgeable
are you about the [Institution]?” (response options: 0 = not at all, 1 = slightly, 2 = moderately,
3 = very, and 4 = extremely). We also asked a similar question about “water regulation in gen-
eral.” We averaged across the items for the two water regulatory institutions and water institu-
tions in general to create a three-item subjective knowledge scale (Cronbach’s α = .83-.89
across the six time points). To assess objective knowledge of water regulatory institutions, all
participants also answered 12 factual multiple-choice questions in each survey concerning the
specific water regulatory institutions and water regulation in general. The total number of cor-
rect responses was used to indicate participant objective knowledge at each survey (S2 File,
Note F). All questions were created specifically for this study and had four possible responses,
with one correct answer. As shown in Table 1, subjective and objective knowledge at the first
survey was very low.
Institutional trust: Our institutional trust scale consisted of four items that represented
direct reports of trust in the specific target institution (i.e., water regulatory institutions), with-
out specifying reasons for that trust (e.g., “My confidence in the [institution] is high”). As pre-
viously noted, it is often unclear exactly what such items are measuring [76], but they are
important because they are commonly used to assess trust in institutions [15, 29–31], espe-
cially in large national and international surveys.
Trustworthiness perceptions: Our trustworthiness items assessed trust-relevant constructs
that represent potential bases or reasons for psychological trust (e.g., “[institution] is honest”).
We term these constructs “trustworthiness perceptions,” because most of the constructs are
perceptions of a specific institution that make that institution “worthy” of trust and may be
viewed as antecedents or bases for one’s direct expression of trust [18]. All participants rated
Nebraska’s water regulatory institutions on 40 items representing 12 different trustworthiness
constructs, including perceptions of competence (2 items), benevolence (3 items), and integ-
rity (3 items), corresponding to constructs in the Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman [18] model, as
well as other commonly studied constructs [77]: perceptions of shared values (3 items) [78];
perceived legitimacy (4 items), cynical perceptions (4 items), and felt obligation to obey (4
items) [61]; loyalty (4 items) [15]; and justice constructs of perceived respectfulness (3 items),
bias (4 items), voice (3 items), and distributive justice (3 items) [79–81]. Items assessing these
constructs were taken directly or adapted from a variety of prior measures [16, 57, 82] and,
upon evaluation (S2 File, Note G), were used to form two scales assessing distrustworthiness
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perceptions (2 scales, bias and cynicism, comprised of 8 items total), and positive trustworthi-
ness (the remaining 10 scales, comprised of 32 items total).
Generalized trust: Finally, participants responded to 9 items pertaining to their disposi-
tional trust, and 7 items to assess trust in governmental institutions generally (S2 File, Note
H).
2.4. Analytic strategy
2.4.1. Manipulation checks. To confirm the effect of our institutional knowledge
manipulations, we examined whether longitudinal change in subjective and objective knowl-
edge (about water regulatory institutions) across the six surveys was a function of time and
experimental condition using multilevel general linear regression in SAS 9.3 PROC MIXED,
with restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Predictors included a random intercept, a
fixed effect of institution manipulation (coded 0 = control, 1 = experimental), fixed and ran-
dom effects of time (coded as 0–5), and the interaction between time and the institution
manipulation.
2.4.2. Preliminary analyses. We next examined overall between-participant differences in
our primary measures (institutional trust, positive trustworthiness, distrustworthiness, trust in
government, and dispositional trust) by estimating five random intercept, unconditional
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for institutional trust and trustworthiness scales at survey 1 (T0) and internal reliability across time points (T0 to
T5).
Measure Mean (T0) SD (T0) Cronbach’s α ranges (T0-T5)
Low to High
Knowledge
Subjective Knowledge 0.568 0.624 .832 .893
Objective Knowledge 3.692 2.744 .543 .861
Dependent Variable
Institutional Trust 4.996 0.836 .927 .958
Positive Trustworthiness 4.918 0.715 .978 .985
Legitimacy 5.029 0.760 .880 .943
Respect 5.008 0.811 .901 .937
Bias 3.838 0.696 .740 .880
Voice 4.805 0.740 .802 .902
Distributive Justice 4.992 0.857 .897 .944
Loyalty 4.770 0.784 .846 .878
Shared Values 4.748 0.836 .908 .945
Benevolence 4.905 0.785 .836 .929
Competence 5.034 0.855 .868 .916
Honesty/Integrity 4.894 0.813 .886 .949
Distrustworthiness 3.688 0.689 .854 .919
Cynicism 3.538 0.796 .784 .891
Obligation to Obey 5.000 0.859 .856 .914
Generalized Trust
Governmental Trust 4.948 0.961 .846 .898
Dispositional Trust 5.232 0.805 .894 .935
Notes. T0 = time zero and survey 1, T5 = time 5 and survey 6. Subjective knowledge was on a scale from 0 (low)-4 (high); objective knowledge reflects the
total number of correct answers to 12 factual questions (possible range of 0–12). The remainder of the scales could range from 1 to 7 as described in the
text.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t001
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means models (also known as null or empty models) which partitioned variance into within-
and between-participant components for each measure [83]. We then examined baseline rat-
ings as well as linear change in each primary measure across surveys by estimating uncondi-
tional longitudinal models including random and fixed effects of intercept and linear time
slope. These models allowed us to test for significant between-participant variance in the effects
of time (coded 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) across participants and to establish estimates of intercepts
and their variances. Finally, using the best-fitting unconditional models, we added the effect of
the institution information manipulation to each model to examine whether that effect was sig-
nificant within each univariate model, and whether it impacted other results from each model.
2.4.3. Hypothesis testing. We tested Hypotheses 1 through 4 in two different ways. First,
we used multivariate multilevel modeling (MMLM). This method is appropriate when there is
non-zero variation in dependent and independent variables’ change over time, and provides
several advantages over univariate, multilevel modeling, including more powerful tests of fixed
effects and a reduction of Type I error [83–85]. In our MMLM models, we examined the
within-participant relations between generalized trust measures and institutional trust and the
within-participant relations between perceptions of institutional trustworthiness or distrust-
worthiness and institutional trust. Predictors included manipulation (coded 0 = control,
1 = experimental) as well as the predictors in the best-fitting univariate models for each vari-
able. Our hypotheses predicted that the within-participant correlations between residuals
involving generalized trust and both trustworthiness variables and institutional trust would be
stronger for control group than experimental group participants. We also predicted the corre-
lations between trustworthiness (i.e., positive trustworthiness and distrustworthiness percep-
tions) and institutional trust would differ between groups. For these MMLM models, we
utilized PROC GLIMMIX with restricted maximum likelihood estimation and examined spe-
cific hypotheses using ESTIMATE, CONTRAST, and COVTEST statements.
Initial multivariate analyses on the larger models indicated the data did not contain enough
estimable variability between participants to attribute to random effects. Due to this limitation,
additional models were estimated using a “slopes-as-outcomes” approach [83]. This approach
predicts institutional trust by estimating grand mean-centered individual intercepts and linear
change slopes of predictor measures as between-participant (BP) predictors, and time-varying
residuals as time-varying within-participant (WP) predictors. In each model, we examined
the time × manipulation × BP predictors, as well as the time × manipulation × WP predictors
interactions, to determine if the effects of the BP or WP predictors of institutional trust
changed over time differently between the control and experimental groups. Significant inter-
actions involving manipulation and predictor slopes would indicate differences between
groups in how change over time in a predictor related to change over time of the outcome vari-
able. For example, significant interactions involving time, manipulation, and WP variance in a
predictor would indicate differences between groups in how deviation from one’s predicted
value on the predictor relates to the outcome variable over time. Our theoretical model pre-
dicted closer relations among the control group that remain relatively constant over time and,
in general, decreasing relations over time for the experimental group (for H1, H2, and H4; H3
was nondirectional). (Note that the longitudinal data, formatting, and syntax for all models
can be found in S3, S4 and S5 Files, respectively).
3. Results
3.1. Manipulation checks
As can be seen in Table 2 and Fig 1, our manipulation appeared to influence both knowledge
types, though the time x manipulation interaction was significant only for subjective knowledge.
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for manipulation check models predicting knowledge.
Subjective Knowledge
Fixed Effects B SE B df F-value p-value
Constant 0.496 0.075 N/A N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) 0.039 0.019 1, 147 37.28 < .001
Information Manipulation 0.132 0.091 1, 184 2.09 .150
Time (Linear Slope) × Information Manipulation 0.059 0.023 1, 147 6.90 .010
Variance Parameters Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Random Intercept 0.252 0.036 7.01 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance 0.006 0.002 3.02 .001
Intercept / Slope Covariance -0.004 0.007 0.66 .506
Residual Variance 0.159 0.010 16.70 < .001
Objective Knowledge
Fixed Effects B SE B df F-value p-value
Constant 3.796 0.313 N/A N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) 0.267 0.085 1, 149 44.03 < .001
Information Manipulation -0.282 0.382 1, 182 0.54 .461
Time (Linear Slope) × Information Manipulation 0.153 0.104 1, 149 2.19 .141
Variance Parameters Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Random Intercept 4.400 0.631 6.97 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance 0.189 0.047 4.05 < .001
Intercept / Slope Covariance -0.668 0.151 4.43 < .001
Residual Variance 2.691 0.167 16.08 < .001
Notes. Model coding was as follows: Time: 0 = First survey (reference group), 1 = Second survey, 2 = Third survey, etc.; Institution: 0 = DHHS (reference/
control group) information, 1 = DNR or NRD information. B = Unstandardized parameter estimate. SE = standard error. Each estimate indicates the effect of
each condition compared to the reference group, as estimated by the model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t002
Fig 1. Average levels of subjective and objective knowledge over time for the experimental and control groups. Notes. Subjective
knowledge (left panel) was on a scale from 0 (low)-4 (high); objective knowledge (right panel) reflects the total number of correct answers to
12 factual questions (range 0–12). Preliminary manipulation checks indicated the increases in subjective knowledge differed between the
experimental and control groups as expected. The difference in objective knowledge increases was in the predicted direction but not
statistically significant.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g001
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The non-significant effect of manipulation on the intercept at survey 1 (time = 0; Bs = .13, -.28;
SEs = .09, .38 Fs(1,184; 1, 182) = 2.09, .54; ps = .15, .46, for subjective and objective knowledge
respectively) confirms that average subjective and objective knowledge ratings did not differ
between conditions prior to the first institution manipulation (S2 File, Note I). Although
subjective knowledge mean scores increased significantly for those in the control condition (i.-
e., Btime = .04, p< .001), the significant time × institution interaction indicated that subjective
knowledge increased at a greater rate for those in the water regulatory experimental condition
(interaction effect B = .06, SE = .02, p = .01), becoming significantly different at survey 2 (time 1,
t(186) = 2.25, p = .03), and remaining so for the remainder of the study. For objective knowledge
scores, the difference (i.e., time × institution interaction) was in the expected direction but was
not statistically significant.
3.2. Preliminary analyses
3.2.1. Correlations. Table 3 displays the means, standard deviations, and a correlation
heat map plot (in which darker shading indicates stronger correlations) to illustrate the varied
strength of correlations for study variables at each survey. Consistent with prior studies [16],
very high correlations (rs> .90) were observed between unspecified institutional trust and
trustworthiness at each time point. As expected, the lowest correlations were those among the
generalized trust variables (dispositional trust and governmental trust) and specific trust vari-
ables (institutional trust and trustworthiness perceptions).
3.2.2. Unconditional models. Examination of the unconditional empty models indicated
significant between-participant variance for all measures (all χ2 (1) > 436.48, p’s< .01). Intra-
class correlations indicated that the percentage of the total variation residing between partici-
pants was 66% for institutional trust, 68% for trustworthiness, 59% for distrustworthiness, 62%
for governmental trust, and 60% for dispositional trust.
When examining and modeling the effects of time for each of our main variables (S2 File,
Note J), the best-fitting baseline-intercept models for institutional trust and perceived positive
trustworthiness each included significant linear and quadratic effects of Time. Both measures
showed an overall average significant increase over time (effect of time, linear slope) that gradu-
ally became less positive with each subsequent survey (time, quadratic slope)—that is, both
institutional trust and perceptions of trustworthiness first increased and then plateaued over
time. Thus, by the final survey, the linear effect of time was non-significant for both institutional
trust (estimated linear slope at Survey 6 = -0.02, t(709) = 0.60, p = .55) as well as positive trust-
worthiness (estimated linear slope at Survey 6 = -0.013, t(708) = 0.46, p = .65). Dispositional
trust and perceived distrustworthiness only included a linear effect of time, with dispositional
trust showing an overall average significant increase over time and perceived distrustworthiness
showing an overall decrease. Finally, the linear effect of time was not significant for governmen-
tal trust; thus, on average, trust in government neither increased nor decreased.
3.2.3. Univariate models with information manipulation. The addition of institution
manipulation as a predictor resulted in the same overall patterns of change in our primary
measures, and the random variances in intercepts and slopes (change over time) remained sig-
nificant (see Table 4 and Fig 2a–2e). Taken together, these results indicate significant between-
participant variance in both the intercepts and change over time for each of our variables.
There were no significant differences in the effect of time (linear and sometimes also qua-
dratic slopes) between manipulation conditions for institutional trust (Fig 2a), perceived trust-
worthiness (Fig 2b), perceived distrustworthiness (Fig 2c), or governmental trust (Fig 2d),
indicating similar changes over time for both groups on these variables. There was, however, a
significant interaction between time and institution manipulation when predicting
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
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Table 3. Correlations among study variables.
Institutional Trust Trustworthiness Distrustworthiness
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Inst. Trust, S1 5.00 0.84
2. Inst. Trust, S2 5.10 0.80 .69
3. Inst. Trust, S3 5.20 0.82 .66 .67
4. Inst. Trust, S4 5.25 0.81 .66 .74 .72
5. Inst. Trust, S5 5.22 0.89 .57 .56 .66 .79
6. Inst. Trust, S6 5.28 0.82 .55 .64 .73 .78 .77
7. Trustworth., S1 4.92 0.72 .94 .70 .66 .63 .56 .55
8. Trustworth., S2 5.00 0.71 .70 .94 .68 .73 .59 .67 .74
9. Trustworth., S3 5.11 0.74 .65 .66 .95 .72 .67 .71 .67 .71
10. Trustworth., S4 5.17 0.72 .63 .71 .73 .92 .79 .79 .67 .77 .78
11. Trustworth., S5 5.16 0.80 .56 .52 .67 .75 .95 .73 .59 .59 .73 .80
12. Trustworth., S6 5.20 0.71 .54 .60 .71 .74 .76 .93 .59 .68 .74 .81 .78
13. Distrustw., S1 3.69 0.69 -.62 -.51 -.46 -.49 -.46 -.41 -.60 -.49 -.47 -.49 -.46 -.42
14. Distrustw., S2 3.60 0.69 -.56 -.68 -.50 -.55 -.42 -.50 -.61 -.69 -.52 -.56 -.41 -.49 .61
15. Distrustw., S3 3.50 0.78 -.61 -.62 -.66 -.62 -.64 -.62 -.64 -.66 -.67 -.66 -.67 -.64 .57 .69
16. Distrustw., S4 3.36 0.82 -.60 -.64 -.61 -.72 -.60 -.62 -.64 -.66 -.65 -.74 -.62 -.63 .52 .64 .70
17. Distrustw., S5 3.38 0.88 -.56 -.51 -.57 -.64 -.63 -.58 -.60 -.55 -.61 -.67 -.62 -.59 .54 .61 .71
18. Distrustw., S6 3.29 0.83 -.47 -.55 -.58 -.60 -.56 -.73 -.52 -.60 -.58 -.65 -.58 -.73 .38 .55 .66
19. Disp. Trust, S1 5.23 0.81 .45 .38 .50 .38 .35 .36 .47 .38 .46 .40 .37 .36 -.36 -.25 -.38
20. Disp. Trust, S2 5.25 0.73 .39 .43 .46 .41 .34 .32 .40 .40 .43 .42 .34 .37 -.32 -.27 -.34
21. Disp. Trust, S3 5.41 0.79 .39 .33 .52 .41 .38 .33 .38 .35 .51 .42 .41 .34 -.31 -.23 -.37
22. Disp. Trust, S4 5.37 0.76 .30 .37 .46 .39 .37 .39 .31 .37 .43 .42 .38 .37 -.33 -.22 -.30
23. Disp. Trust, S5 5.38 0.74 .39 .35 .49 .39 .52 .49 .39 .34 .49 .41 .52 .50 -.37 -.21 -.36
24. Disp. Trust, S6 5.42 0.83 .28 .21 .33 .37 .39 .38 .30 .30 .30 .40 .39 .41 -.18+ -.17+ -.31
25. Govt. Trust, S1 4.95 0.96 .50 .37 .46 .49 .42 .35 .49 .37 .41 .46 .42 .35 -.31 -.27 -.32
26. Govt. Trust, S2 4.90 1.07 .39 .44 .51 .51 .45 .46 .37 .44 .48 .51 .44 .45 -.28 -.31 -.33
27. Govt. Trust, S3 4.88 1.15 .41 .38 .57 .54 .56 .60 .38 .40 .54 .55 .56 .58 -.24 -.30 -.34
28. Govt. Trust, S4 5.17 1.04 .39 .40 .57 .51 .51 .51 .38 .40 .52 .49 .51 .48 -.27 -.26 -.36
29. Govt. Trust, S5 4.90 1.06 .36 .31 .55 .52 .55 .55 .34 .34 .49 .48 .57 .52 -.25 -.30 -.42
30. Govt. Trust, S6 4.97 1.07 .27 .29 .44 .36 .39 .51 .27 .28 .39 .35 .38 .51 -.18 -.31 -.33
Distrustworthiness Dispositional Trust Governmental Trust
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
17. Distrustw., S5 .76
18. Distrustw., S6 .75 .67
19. Disp. Trust, S1 -.32 -.22 -.29
20. Disp. Trust, S2 -.29 -.26 -.29 .71
21. Disp. Trust, S3 -.34 -.27 -.32 .70 .67
22. Disp. Trust, S4 -.24 -.29 -.34 .63 .57 .65
23. Disp. Trust, S5 -.29 -.29 -.35 .64 .71 .67 .62
24. Disp. Trust, S6 -.23 -.25 -.23 .50 .45 .59 .53 .46
25. Govt. Trust, S1 -.35 -.37 -.27 .50 .40 .42 .31 .29 .31
26. Govt. Trust, S2 -.38 -.33 -.33 .29 .49 .31 .18 .38 .23 .58
27. Govt. Trust, S3 -.37 -.36 -.35 .34 .39 .39 .28 .44 .25 .57 .78
28. Govt. Trust, S4 -.32 -.36 -.38 .39 .43 .47 .45 .39 .26 .60 .57 .74
29. Govt. Trust, S5 -.34 -.33 -.38 .31 .41 .41 .29 .46 .34 .51 .69 .77 .77
(Continued )
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dispositional trust (Fig 2e). This interaction, which we had not hypothesized, indicated that
dispositional trust decreased significantly over time for those in the control condition (time,
linear slope = -.003, p = .03), while those in the experimental condition significantly increased
(time, linear slope = 0.06, p< .01).
3.3. Hypothesis testing: Multivariate multilevel and slopes-as-outcomes
models
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Generalized trust predicting institutional trust. Having examined
and modeled the effects of time, we next examined models relevant to our hypotheses. H1
stated that the relation between generalized trust and institutional trust over time would
become smaller among those gaining knowledge (i.e., the experimental group), and thus
would be greater for those who are and who remain less knowledgeable (i.e., the control
group) compared to those who become more knowledgeable about the institution as time pro-
gressed (i.e., the experimental group). Although not a direct test of changes in relations over
time, examining the within-participant (WP) residuals from the MMLM model is informative.
Our results (reported in Table 5 and Fig 3) generally do not support H1. The WP covariance
between dispositional trust and institutional trust (τ2U11U21) was positive for both the control
group (covariance = .08, r = .26, p< .01), and the experimental group (covariance = .07, r =
.24, p< .01), and contrary to our hypothesis, there was no significant difference between the
two groups (χ2(1) = 0.24, p = .62). Similarly, the WP covariance between governmental trust
and institutional trust (τ2U11U31) was not significantly greater for those in the control condi-
tion (covariance = .07, r = .28, p< .01) (S2 File, Note K) compared to those in the experimental
condition (covariance = .04, r = .16, p< .01), although the difference was in the predicted
direction, χ2(1) = 3.25, p = .07 (S2 File, Note L). Finally, although not hypothesized, there was
a significantly greater governmental trust—dispositional trust covariance (τ2U21U31, χ2(1) =
12.76, p< .001) among the experimental group (covariance = .10, r = .32, p< .01) than among
the control group (covariance = -.002, r = -.01, p = .54).
We also examined the “slopes-as-outcomes” model (see S1 Table for the full model) to
explore changes in relationships over time. Our hypotheses were most concerned with changes
over time (i.e., the model predicting the institutional trust slope, see Note M in S2 File) that
differed between our control and experimental groups (i.e., involving interactions with manip-
ulation). Our analyses indicated a significant interaction involving the institutional trust and
governmental trust slopes (γ19 = -.47, p = .04), but not between the institutional trust and dis-
positional trust slopes (γ18 = -.52, p = .32). There also were no interactions involving govern-
mental or dispositional trust WP residuals (γ112, γ113, ps> .20). The significant effect of
governmental trust slope on institutional trust (γ17 = 0.62, p< .01) indicates, for control group
participants, a greater change in institutional trust across surveys for those control participants
with higher governmental trust slopes. The institutional trust slope × government trust
slope × manipulation interaction (γ19 = -.47, p = .04) indicates there was a significant differ-
ence between manipulation groups for the effect of the governmental trust slope on the institu-
tional trust slope (illustrated in Fig 4, left panel). While the effect of governmental trust slope
Table 3. (Continued)
30. Govt. Trust, S6 -.27 -.29 -.37 .27 .37 .26 .26 .42 .20 .41 .61 .70 .70 .79
+Correlation significant at p < .10 (all other correlations are significant at p < .05). Darker shading indicates stronger relationships between variables. S1-S6
refers to survey 1 to survey 6. Correlations between time adjacent repeated measures are in boxes.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t003
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Table 4. Multilevel univariate models for primary outcome measures predicted by information manipulation.
Effect Estimate SE 95% CI DF F/Z-value p-value
Institutional Trust
Fixed
Intercept (Survey 1) 4.941 0.100 3.515–6.367 194 N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) 0.098*** 0.036 -0.193–0.389 705 13.39 < .001
Time × Time (Quadratic Slope) -0.014* 0.006 602 5.70 .017
Manipulation effect 0.085 0.121 183 0.49 .484
Time ×Manipulation effect 0.034 0.027 143 1.49 .224
Random
Intercept Variance (Survey 1)
Control 0.529*** 0.115 4.61 < .001
Experimental 0.467*** 0.074 6.32 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance
Control 0.022** 0.007 3.02 .001
Experimental 0.009** 0.003 2.66 .004
Intercept / Linear Slope Covariance
Control -0.020 0.022 0.93 .350
Experimental -0.023 0.012 1.86 .062
Residual Variance
Control 0.168*** 0.018 9.42 < .001
Experimental 0.194*** 0.014 13.61 < .001
Positive Trustworthiness
Fixed
Intercept 4.850 0.088 3.615–6.085 193 N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) 0.096*** 0.030 0.737–1.183 704 17.83 < .001
Time × Time (Quadratic Slope) -0.013** 0.005 601 6.84 .009
Manipulation effect 0.093 0.106 183 0.77 .381
Time ×Manipulation effect 0.031 0.023 142 1.83 .179
Random
Intercept Variance (Survey 1)
Control 0.397*** 0.087 4.57 < .001
Experimental 0.379*** 0.058 6.54 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance
Control 0.013** 0.010 2.54 .006
Experimental 0.008*** 0.002 3.14 < .001
Intercept / Linear Slope Covariance
Control -0.008 0.015 0.55 .579
Experimental -0.019* 0.009 1.99 .047
Residual Variance
Control 0.134*** 0.014 9.36 < .001
Experimental 0.131*** 0.010 13.59 < .001
Distrustworthiness
Fixed
Intercept 3.732 0.082 2.827–4.637 183 N/A N/A
Time Linear Slope -0.056*** 0.024 -0.262–0.150 144 19.09 < .001
Manipulation effect -0.098 0.101 182 0.95 .331
Time ×Manipulation effect -0.013 0.029 144 0.20 .654
Random
(Continued )
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Table 4. (Continued)
Effect Estimate SE 95% CI DF F/Z-value p-value
Intercept Variance (Survey 1)
Control 0.213*** 0.061 3.53 < .001
Experimental 0.354*** 0.059 6.02 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance
Control 0.011* 0.001 1.98 .024
Experimental 0.017*** 0.004 3.92 < .001
Intercept / Linear Slope Covariance
Control 0.011 0.014 0.75 .456
Experimental -0.008 0.012 0.68 .499
Residual Variance
Control 0.186*** 0.020 9.32 < .001
Experimental 0.183*** 0.013 13.57 < .001
Dispositional Trust
Fixed
Intercept 5.320 0.096 4.139–6.501 184 N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) -0.003* 0.020 -0.218–0.212 144 5.00 .027
Manipulation effect -0.111 0.117 183 0.90 .344
Time ×Manipulation effect 0.060* 0.025 144 6.05 .015
Random
Intercept Variance (Survey 1)
Control 0.363*** 0.092 3.96 < .001
Experimental 0.467*** 0.075 6.20 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance
Control 0.012* 0.006 2.14 .016
Experimental 0.002 0.003 0.86 .196
Intercept / Linear Slope Covariance
Control -0.017 0.018 0.90 .370
Experimental -0.023 0.011 2.12 .034
Residual Variance
Control 0.230*** 0.024 9.64 < .001
Experimental 0.212*** 0.016 13.55 < .001
Governmental Trust
Fixed
Intercept 4.833 0.121 2.900–6.766 185 N/A N/A
Time (Linear Slope) 0.003 0.030 -0.364–0.370 147 0.89 .348
Manipulation effect 0.133 0.148 184 0.80 .371
Time ×Manipulation effect 0.028 0.036 145 0.59 .445
Random
Intercept Variance (Survey 1)
Control 0.973*** 0.213 4.56 < .001
Experimental 0.544*** 0.097 5.60 < .001
Time (Linear Slope) Variance
Control 0.035** 0.012 2.55 .002
Experimental 0.011* 0.005 2.06 .020
Intercept / Linear Slope Covariance
Control -0.024 0.038 0.62 .534
Experimental -0.013 0.018 0.74 .460
(Continued )
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Table 4. (Continued)
Effect Estimate SE 95% CI DF F/Z-value p-value
Residual Variance
Control 0.327*** 0.035 9.46 < .001
Experimental 0.365*** 0.027 13.52 < .001
*p < .05,
**p < .01,
***p < .001.
Model coding was as follows: Time Linear Slope: 0 = First survey, 1 = Second survey, 2 = Third survey, etc.; Manipulation effect: 0 = DHHS (reference/
control group) information, 1 = DNR or NRD information. Estimate = Unstandardized parameter estimate. All numerator DF = 1. Each estimate indicates the
effect of each condition compared to the reference group, as estimated by the model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t004
Fig 2. Predicted levels of key variables over time for the control and experimental groups. Notes. Predicted values were based on
univariate models including time and information manipulation conditions as described in the text. There were no significant differences in
the trajectories of the control and experimental groups in Figs 2a-2d. There was a significant difference in slopes for Fig 2e.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g002
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on institutional trust slope was significant for those in the control group, it was not significant
for those in the experimental group (experimental group estimate = .15, p = .31). Meanwhile,
as illustrated in Fig 4 (right panel), the significant effect of dispositional trust slope on institu-
tional trust slope indicates that participants in the control group with higher dispositional
trust slopes showed a greater change in institutional trust across surveys (γ16 = 1.23, p< .01).
Although the experimental group estimate appeared smaller (estimate = 0.71, t(720) = 1.93, p =
.05), the non-significant interaction indicates it was not statistically different from the control
group estimate.
In summary, the overall pattern of results was partly consistent with H1. We had expected
the experimental group to begin with positive relations between generalized trust variables and
institutional trust, and we expected this relation to become weaker over time. As hypothesized,
there was some marginally significant (in the MMLM model) and statistically significant (in
Table 5. Multivariate multilevel model 1: Institutional trust, dispositional trust, and governmental trust.
Model Effects Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Cross-Variable Within-Participant Covariances
Institutional Trust & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U21 Control 0.082*** 0.022 1.182 < .001
Experimental 0.070*** 0.014 2.111 < .001
Institutional Trust & Governmental Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U31 Control 0.071*** 0.017 4.118 < .001
Experimental 0.036*** 0.010 3.700 < .001
Governmental Trust & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U21*U31 Control -0.002 a 0.023 0.500 0.309
Experimental 0.096*** a 0.014 1.815 < .001
*p < .05,
**p < .01,
***p < .001 significant parameter estimates
a p < .001 differences between control group and experimental group estimates.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t005
Fig 3. Covariances based on Multivariate Multilevel Model (MMLM) analyses. Notes. +p< .01, *p < .05; two-tailed, black outside
bars = differences in covariances, white within bars = individual covariances. This figure is a graphical representation of the covariances
listed in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8. H1, H2, H3 indicate comparisons relevant to hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 respectively. H1 and H2 were that
experimental would be < control. H3 was that experimental and control covariances would be different. NH indicates a comparison not
hypothesized. DT = dispositional trust, GT = governmental trust, IT = institutional trust, TW = trustworthiness perceptions,
DTW = distrustworthiness perceptions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g003
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the slopes-as-outcomes model) evidence for this occurring for the governmental trust variable,
but these effects only involved relations between changes over time (slopes) and not relations
between WP residuals. Contrary to our hypothesis, a similar pattern involving dispositional
trust did not achieve statistical significance.
3.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Generalized trust predicting perceptions of trustworthiness. Our
second hypothesis (H2) postulated that, among the experimental group only, the relationships
between generalized trust variables and trustworthiness variables (including positive trustwor-
thiness and distrustworthiness) also should decrease over time. To avoid problems with high
collinearity, we examined trustworthiness and distrustworthiness in separate models. Again,
examination of the within-participant (WP) residuals from the MMLM results is informative.
The first model (Table 6, see also Fig 3, H2 comparisons) is similar to the model used to test
H1, but included trustworthiness in the model instead of institutional trust. As expected, the
WP covariance between dispositional trust and trustworthiness (τ2U11U21) was significant in
the positive direction for both those in the experimental group (covariance = .07, r = .27, p<
.01) and control group (covariance = .08, r = .28, p< .01). However, contrary to our hypothe-
sis, the covariances did not significantly differ (χ2 (1) = 0.17, p = .68), as would be expected if
Fig 4. Institutional trust slope as predicted by governmental trust slope and dispositional trust slope for control and experimental
groups. Notes. Predicted values based on slopes-as-outcomes models (see S1 Table) which indicated a significant difference between the
experimental and control groups for the relationship between governmental trust and institutional trust slopes (left panel), but not for the
relationship between dispositional trust and institutional trust slopes (right panel).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g004
Table 6. Results from multivariate multilevel model 2: Trustworthiness, dispositional trust, and governmental trust.
Model Effects Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Cross-Variable Within-Participant Covariances
Trustworthiness & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U21 Control 0.077*** 0.019 4.063 < .001
Experimental 0.068*** 0.012 5.667 < .001
Trustworthiness & Governmental Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U31 Control 0.056*** 0.015 3.733 < .001
Experimental 0.038*** 0.009 4.222 < .001
Governmental Trust & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U21*U31 Control -0.002 a 0.023 0.087 .465
Experimental 0.096***a 0.014 6.857 < .001
*p < .05,
**p < .01,
***p < .001 significant parameter estimates
a Indicates p < .001 differences between control group and experimental group estimates (this difference is the same as in Table 5 because governmental
and dispositional trust were in both Table 5 and Table 6 models).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t006
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the experimental group covariance decreased over time. Similarly, the WP covariance between
governmental trust and trustworthiness was positive for both experimental and control groups
(covariances = .04, .06, rs = .21, .26, ps< .01, respectively), and it did not significantly differ
between groups (χ2 (1) = 0.12, p = .28).
Examination of the slopes-as-outcomes model (see S2 Table for full model) indicates the
generalized trust and positive trustworthiness slopes were positively related, as expected. For
the control group, a 1-point increase in dispositional trust slope corresponded to a trustworthi-
ness slope significantly increasing by 0.89 (γ16, p< .01). Meanwhile, a 1-point increase in the
governmental trust slope predicted a significant increase of 0.41 in the trustworthiness slope
(γ17, p< .01). The lack of significant interactions indicated that the experimental and control
groups did not differ on these effects. In addition, the WP dispositional trust effect did not sig-
nificantly relate to trustworthiness and did not significantly differ between manipulation
groups (S2 Table, γ110, γ112). Finally, the 3-way interaction between WP governmental trust,
time, and manipulation was in the correct direction (specifically, indicating more decrease
over time of the covariance for the experimental group than the control group, which instead
increased, as illustrated in Fig 5), but only marginally significant (γ113 = -0.06, t(255) = 1.71,
p = .09) (S2 File, Note N).
Next, we examined the pattern of findings replacing trustworthiness with distrustworthi-
ness in our models (see Table 7, see also Fig 3, H2 comparisons). As expected, the within-par-
ticipant covariance between dispositional trust and distrustworthiness (τ2U11U21) was negative
Fig 5. Within-Person (WP) deviation from predicted governmental trust ratings effect on trustworthiness slope over time, for
control and experimental groups. Note. Figure illustrates the marginal three way interaction between WP governmental trust, time, and
experimental manipulation prediting change in trustworthiness perceptions over time (i.e., trustworthiness slope) as described in note 15
(see also S2 Table).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g005
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for both those in the control group (covariance = -.04, r = -.13, p = .03) and the experimental
group (covariance = -.02, r = -.05, p = .13), although the relationship was not significant for the
experimental group. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, this difference was not significantly
different between groups, (χ2(1) = 0.92, p = .34). Also contrary to our hypotheses, the within-
participant correlation between governmental trust and distrustworthiness was not significant
for either group, and the groups did not significantly differ (χ2(1) = 0.48, p = .49).
The slopes-as-outcomes model also produced little evidence of any differences between
groups (see S3 Table) when predicting distrustworthiness. Again, our hypotheses were most
concerned with interactions involving both time (i.e., the model for the slopes) and manipula-
tion (i.e., interactions involving manipulation effects). However, none of the interactions
involving manipulation were significant (ps .11).
In summary, we found only slight evidence in support of H2 when examining positive
trustworthiness. As reported above, only one of four interactions approached significance.
None of the interactions involving distrustworthiness were significant or marginally
significant.
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of trustworthiness predicting institutional trust. Our
third hypothesis (H3) proposed that as participants become more knowledgeable about the
water regulatory institutions across time (i.e., those in the experimental condition), we
expected changes in the relative ability of specific trustworthiness judgments to predict institu-
tional trust. For example, certain facets of trustworthiness (e.g., our positive trustworthiness or
distrustworthiness scales) may remain closely related to institutional trust, while others
become less closely related. Because of the high collinearity of our variables (see Table 3), we
conducted two separate MMLM models predicting institutional trust, one including positive
trustworthiness as the predictor, and one including distrustworthiness. Once again, examina-
tion of the averages is useful. As can be seen in Table 8 (see also Fig 3, H3 comparisons), our
results did not support our hypothesis. The experimental and control group average within-
participant covariances did not differ significantly when examining either the covariances
between institutional trust and trustworthiness (τ2U11U21, experimental and control respective
covariances = .18, .16, r = .87, .87, χ2 (1) = 0.38, p = .54) or between institutional trust and dis-
trustworthiness (τ2U11U21 = -.08, -.08, r = -.24, -.22, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .95).
Examination of the “slopes-as-outcomes” model predicting institutional trust from trust-
worthiness and time (see S4 Table) indicated a significant difference between groups in the
effects of trustworthiness slope on institutional trust slope (γ15 = -0.43, p< .01). As shown in
Table 7. Multivariate multilevel model 3: Distrustworthiness, dispositional trust, and governmental trust.
Model Effects Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Between-Variable Within-Participant Covariances
Distrustworthiness & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U21 Control -0.041* 0.021 1.905 0.028
Experimental -0.016 0.014 1.143 0.127
Distrustworthiness & Governmental Trust Covariance, τ2U11*U31 Control -0.011 0.016 0.688 0.754
Experimental 0.003 0.010 0.300 0.382
Governmental Trust & Dispositional Trust Covariance, τ2U21*U31 Control -0.002a 0.023 0.087 0.465
Experimental 0.096*** a 0.014 6.857 < .001
*p < .05,
**p < .01,
***p < .001 significant parameter estimates
a Indicates p < .05 differences between control group and experimental group estimates.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t007
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Fig 6 (left panel), for every 1-point increase in a control participant’s trustworthiness slope, the
institutional trust slope significantly increased by 1.48 (γ14, p< .01). However, that effect was
significantly lower for those in the experimental group (estimated effect = 1.05, p< .01). Thus,
the effect of overall change in trustworthiness perceptions over time on overall change in insti-
tutional trust was stronger for the control group and weaker (though still significant) for the
experimental group. This is consistent with our hypothesis that experimental group members
would form distinctions among our three types of trust variables (generalized trust variables,
trustworthiness perceptions, and expressions of direct institutional trust). However, the pat-
tern of results was different for the model including distrustworthiness as the predictor (full
results shown in S5 Table, see also Fig 6, right panel). In this model, there were no significant
differences between the experimental and control groups in the relations between institutional
trust and distrustworthiness slopes over time.
3.3.4. Hypothesis 4: Changes in the relations between Within-Person (WP) trustworthi-
ness perceptions and institutional trust over time. H4 stated that among those in the exper-
imental condition, institutional trust would become less associated with within-participant
fluctuations in various trustworthiness perceptions (including trustworthiness and distrust-
worthiness). Examination of the “slopes-as-outcomes” models used above for H3 (full models
reported in S4 and S5 Tables) provides information relevant to these hypotheses. Results indi-
cated a significant 3-way interaction between WP trustworthiness, time, and manipulation (S4
Table, γ17 = -.12, p< .01) predicting institutional trust. The pattern of this interaction (illus-
trated in Fig 7) was such that the WP effect of trustworthiness at survey 1 (i.e., time 0) was
Table 8. Multivariate multilevel models 3 and 4: Institutional trust and positive trustworthiness, and institutional trust and distrustworthiness.
Model Effects Estimate SE Z-value p-value
Cross-Variable Within-Participant Covariances
Institutional Trust & Trustworthiness Covariance, τ2U11*U21 Control 0.175*** 0.017 10.29 < .001
Experimental 0.162*** 0.011 14.73 < .001
Institutional Trust & Distrustworthiness Covariance, τ2U11*U31 Control -0.078*** 0.016 4.88 < .001
Experimental -0.077*** 0.011 7.00 < .001
***p < .001 significant parameter estimates
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.t008
Fig 6. Effects of trustworthiness and distrustworthiness perceptions slopes on institutional trust slope for control and
experimental groups. Notes. Predicted institutional trust slopes derived from slope-as-outcomes models (see full results in S4 and S5
Tables).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g006
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significantly positive for the control group (γ06 = .66, p< .01) and the experimental group
(estimate = 1.12, p< .01), with the experimental group having a significantly higher effect (γ07
= .46, p< .01). The control group’s relations between WP trustworthiness and one’s institu-
tional trust increased as the study progressed (γ16 = .07, p = .04). However, for the experimen-
tal group the effect of WP trustworthiness (i.e., deviation from one’s predicted rating at any
given survey) on one’s institutional trust became less positive over time (estimate = -.05, t(590)
= 2.24, p = .03), with a final effect of .87 at Survey 6 (t(318) = 11.05, p< .01). This is consistent
with our hypothesis (H4), but support was found only for trustworthiness, and not for distrust-
worthiness. For distrustworthiness, results indicated the 3-way interaction between WP dis-
trustworthiness, time, and manipulation was not significant (S5, γ17 = .10, p = .12).
4. Discussion
Previous research and theory have proposed that the relationship between institutional trust
and generalized trust depends upon the individual’s knowledge of the institution [18, 57, 58].
This study tested the effect of knowledge gains on institutional trust over time. Our manipula-
tion checks confirmed that participants in the experimental condition experienced statistically
significant greater increases in subjective knowledge than those in the control condition, but
the difference in objective knowledge increase between the two conditions was not significant.
Our data therefore only speak to how trust changes as subjective knowledge increases. This is
an important qualification given that prior research finds only a modest relation between sub-
jective and objective knowledge [86, 87].
In addition, both the experimental and control group showed increases in institutional
trust that were stronger at the beginning of the study and plateaued over time. Because the
control group was not exposed to the additional information about water regulatory institu-
tions, this pattern may be more a result of repeated measurement and diffuse familiarity over
time than increases in knowledge, per se.
4.1. Impacts of generalized trust variables
Our first hypothesis (H1) was that the generalized trust constructs—such as propensity to trust
people or government in general—would become less important as a basis for trust in a spe-
cific institution as participants in the experimental condition gained in knowledge of the
institution. Our findings partially supported this hypothesis, suggesting that those receiving
Fig 7. The effects of Within-Person (WP) trustworthiness perceptions (top panel) and distrustworthiness perceptions (lower
panel) on institutional trust over time, for the experimental and control groups. Notes. Effects estimated based on slopes-as-
outcomes models as described in the texts. Although patterns of differences in change over time were consistent with our hypotheses, only
the difference in effects of WP Trustworthiness achieved statistical significance.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387.g007
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information about water-regulatory institutions discriminated between governmental trust
and trust in water institutions more than the control group.
Because our knowledge-centered theory of trust posits that trustworthiness, institutional
trust, and generalized trust constructs start out in an undifferentiated form, with trustworthi-
ness perceptions and institutional trust both being initially estimated from generalized trust,
our second hypothesis (H2) took the same form as H1, but it substituted trustworthiness (and
distrustworthiness) variables for institutional trust. However, save for one marginal effect,
none of our results supported H2. The only support for H2 came from a marginal interaction
effect found in our slopes-as-outcomes models, involving governmental trust becoming less
predictive of change in institutional trustworthiness in the case of the experimental group, but
more predictive in the case of the control group.
The fact that the hypothesized (H1 and H2) patterns were not supported by analyses involv-
ing dispositional trust as the generalized trust variable merits additional discussion. Our data
consistently supported the conclusion that dispositional trust (as opposed to governmental
trust) was not a significantly weaker predictor of either institutional trust or perceptions of
trustworthiness (and distrustworthiness) among those increasing in institutional knowledge.
This undermines our theorized role of generalized trust. Specifically, our study finds that dis-
positional trust may play a more active and ongoing role, continuing to affect institutional
trust even as an individual’s knowledge increases. This is more consistent with the suggestion
that generalized trust’s influence may actually increase as relationships “thicken” and as these
relationships feature greater interpersonal contact [23]. Although interpersonal contact did
not increase here, increased sophistication could, in some cases, humanize institutions in a
way that makes generalized trust more relevant over time instead of less. This is also consistent
with some personality research showing that certain individual differences may increase the
coherence of certain traits and outcomes over time [88, 89]. Our experiment was intended to
resemble how everyday people might learn about institutions in their everyday lives—that is,
through non-intense media exposure. In such contexts, it appears that generalized trust vari-
ables (especially dispositional trust) may continue to exert substantial effects on institutional
trust and its development over repeated information exposures.
4.2. Other bases for institutional trust
Examination of our data also indicated partial but inconsistent support for our prediction that
experimental participants would begin to base their trust in the institution on different trust-
worthiness (and distrustworthiness) factors than the control group. Our prediction was based
on our hypothesis (H3) that the relationships between institution-specific trustworthiness vari-
ables and trust in a target institution would alter with experiences with that institution. It
appears that receiving regular information about the institutions significantly attenuated
the association between perceived trustworthiness and trust. But there were no significant
differences between the experimental and control groups in the extent to which change in per-
ceptions of distrustworthiness predicted change in institutional trust. Consistent with perspec-
tives that view trust and distrust as separate constructs rather than opposite ends of the same
continuum [90, 91], this may suggest that different models are needed to represent how per-
ceptions of distrustworthiness predict unspecified institutional trust as people gain knowledge
of an institution over time. Consistent with the idea that “bad is stronger than good” [92], it
may be that distrustworthiness perceptions continue to be more powerful predictors, whereas
trustworthiness perceptions more quickly lose their power.
We also predicted that exposure to information about the water regulatory institutions
would result in the development of more stable levels of institutional trust, which are less
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influenced by momentary fluctuations (from one’s developmental trajectory) in trustworthi-
ness/distrustworthiness perceptions (H4). When examining trustworthiness (but not distrust-
worthiness), this seemed to be the case for our experimental group. As hypothesized, the effect
of within-person trustworthiness perceptions on institutional trust became significantly less
positive over time for the experimental group. However, for the control group, the significant
predictive effect of trustworthiness fluctuations from one’s developmental trajectory on one’s
institutional trust grew stronger over time rather than decreasing. Although we had not pre-
dicted such an increase in the control group (we had hypothesized that the control group
would not show change in this regard), this effect may be a result of repeated exposure to the
measures pertaining to the water regulatory institutions, which may have sensitized partici-
pants to information about the institutions and increased the coherence of their responding.
Likewise, the fact that the control group significantly increased in its institutional trust (as did
the experimental group) may be, in part, because repeated exposure to questions about the
water regulatory institutions increased familiarity, which tends to increase positive evaluations
of a target [93, 94].
4.3. Strengths, limitations, and future directions
Our main objective in this research was to investigate a knowledge-centered theory of trust
which posits relationships among generalized trust, trustworthiness constructs, and institu-
tional trust, with specific consideration of the extent to which institutional knowledge moder-
ates those relationships over time. Thus, our findings contribute to the trust literature in
organizational behavior, social psychology, political science, and, because of our use of water
regulatory institutions specifically, natural resource management. Little prior research on trust
has taken a longitudinal approach. Although developmental approaches to trust models have
been proposed [95], prior research has not examined the role that institutional knowledge
plays in the evolution of institutional trust and in potentially altering the reasons for (bases of)
that trust. Our research begins to address this gap, empirically and theoretically, contributing
to a more integrated view of how institutional trust evolves over time.
One substantial advantage of our study over prior studies is that participants were ran-
domly assigned to conditions in which they regularly read naturalistic information, about
either water regulatory institutions or an unrelated institution, over a relatively long (i.e.,
15-month) time-period. Participants in both conditions began the study with very little knowl-
edge of water regulatory institutions and, because only the experimental group regularly read
about water regulatory institutions, our design allowed us to distinguish changes due to time
and repeated measures from those due to our experimental manipulation. A second advantage
is our focus on understanding the factors predicting “unspecified” measures of institutional
trust commonly used by large-scale surveys to monitor public trust in specific institutions.
This focus makes our research highly relevant to theoretical issues raised in that very large lit-
erature, as well as to efforts to reform public policy.
Limitations of our study point to the need and opportunity for further research. Our mea-
sures of subjective and objective knowledge suggested that our two groups differed signifi-
cantly in subjective but not in objective knowledge. Given the different effects of these two
types of knowledge found in other research, it is possible that greater support for our emerging
theory may have been found if objective knowledge had also differed significantly between
groups. Also, our measures of unspecified trust versus perceptions of trustworthiness and dis-
trustworthiness were reliable but low in discriminant validity. Future research is needed to bet-
ter understand the situations or contexts in which trustworthiness and distrustworthiness
perceptions are more versus less able to be distinguished from institutional trust [16].
Knowledge effects on the bases of institutional trust
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175387 April 17, 2017 25 / 31
Further study of how commitment to an institution relates to trust would be a fruitful
future direction. In particular, researchers might focus on how the degree to which a sense of
loyalty or felt obligation to an institution [63] is stable and persistent within an individual [15,
60–62]–perhaps more so than trustworthiness perceptions of an institution’s benevolence,
competence, and so on. For example, to what extent are loyalty and a perceived obligation to
obey an institution shaped more by extended relations with an institution than by media expo-
sure and immediate interactions [66, 67]? As we briefly mentioned earlier, commitment has
been examined as both a basis and outcome of trust [15, 19, 68]. Although it seems unlikely
that trustors would specifically feel much loyalty or obligation to an unknown or unfamiliar
institution, as knowledge is gained institutional trust (e.g., based on trustworthiness percep-
tions) may facilitate the development of loyalty or perceived obligation or even crystalize a
strong and stable rejection of loyalty or obligation [68]. These commitments in particular may
subsequently be bases for institutional trust (and distrust) in the future [69].
Future directions might also include other ways of operationalizing our trust variables. For
instance, rather than using scales aimed at measuring individuals’ generalized trust, perhaps
participants’ propensities to trust might be measured according to their behavior during trust
games such as those widely used in behavioral economics research [96, 97]. Further, future
research should be conducted with participants who are not college students given concerns
about the representativeness of college students’ attitudes [98].
4.4. Conclusions
This study provided a rigorous, experimental test of how institutional trust and its bases
change or stay the same as people gain information about and increase in subjective knowledge
about an institutional target over time. The reliable finding that dispositional trust continues
to predict institutional trust and perceptions of trustworthiness over time strongly suggests
that its influence is important in many situations where people are learning more about insti-
tutions through media exposure. We found little support for the idea that (subjectively)
“knowing more” leads to less reliance upon dispositions. Institutions interested in increasing
public trust should not assume that providing more and more information will overcome such
dispositional influences. However, our evidence that governmental trust may begin to de-cou-
ple from institutional trust over time does suggest that people form more nuanced distinctions
that allow them to distinguish among institutions and their trust for each one. To the extent
that an institution’s public trust might benefit from being distinguished from trust in other
institutions, provision of additional information could assist with that goal.
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